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Abstract
There is a strong need to complement the analysis of social well-being at the Eu-
ropean regional level to supplement existing, predominantly economic analysis. This
work extends the measurement of well-being across the EU-15 regions in several ways.
First, we assess the determinants of well-being using a multilevel modelling approach
using data at the national, regional and individual levels. Second, we have extended
the model to account for the eﬀects of social interactions within each group, as well as
intrinsic socio-demographic indicators and higher-level exogenous contextual factors.
Empirical findings support the idea that well-being is strongly dependent both on these
general forms of social interactions and on more specific individual characteristics. We
find that there is some evidence of greater regional eﬀects relative to national eﬀects,
but individual well-being continues to be aﬀected most by micro-level phenomena.
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1 Introduction
Economics is no stranger to jumping across the disciplinary divides and for well over a decade
has been bedfellows with psychology as the fields of experimental and behavioural economics
have developed. As these areas of the subject expand and with accomplishments in such
fields being recognised in the 2002 Nobel prize, economics has sidled oﬀ its pedestal as the
‘dismal’ science and closer to its kindlier and undoubtedly warmer neighbours in the social or
‘soft’ sciences. And as social indicators for such traditionally private events as happiness and
life satisfaction have developed over recent years following the collation of large quantities of
survey data, it was only a matter of time before economics sought to understand the diverse
drivers of human emotion at the macroeconomic level.
Traditionally economic research has focused on collecting and analysing economic data,
while little attention has been paid to measuring attitudes and emotional states. Therefore
economists are able to comment extensively on the material conditions of an individual’s
life but very little can be said about their social experiences and their quality of life, to
the extent that Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman has even called for the establishment of
national ‘well-being accounts’1 to supplement existing economic data.
Therefore, there is clearly a strong need to augment the analysis of social well-being
in economics, both via the data collected and the analyses implemented. And given the
burgeoning literature on the multidimensional aspect of individual well-being, there are nu-
merous findings to start from. Research on the relationship between material circumstances
and how people feel about their lives, finds that in developed countries, economic factors
account for only about 10% of the variation between individuals in measures of life sat-
isfaction or happiness (Helliwell and Putnam (2005); Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade
(2005)). What is actually relevant is that individuals’ levels of life satisfaction and happi-
ness depend mostly on ‘intentional activities’, i.e. the way individuals are functioning both
personally and inter-personally. Ormel, Lindenberg, Steverink, and Verbrugge (1999) have
already attempted to introduce such factors into their work on social production function
(SPF) theory.
Existing evidence also suggests that it is relative income not absolute income that mat-
ters most (Easterlin (1994), Easterlin (2003); Blanchflower and Oswald (2004)). Easterlin
(1974) argues that consumption norms exist in societies as standards against which indi-
viduals measure their own achievements - the eponymous "keeping up with the Joneses".
As objective conditions change across countries and regions, so do social norms and soci-
ety benchmarks. This can explain why many commentators have noted recently that more
prosperous countries are no happier than poorer countries.
Duncan (1975) also finds that satisfaction with the current standard of living is related to
one’s relative position in the income distribution, alongside factors which take into account
an individual’s absolute income level. Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) similarly
1Kahneman D., Krueger A.B., Schkade D., Schwarz N. and Stone A. (2004), ‘Toward National Well-Being
Accounts’, The American Economic Review, Volume 94, Number 2, pp. 429-434(6)
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find that well-being is dependent on a person’s comparison of what they feel they should be
achieving - in this case there is an internal benchmark rather than an external social one.
These studies highlight that individuals use a variety of reference points from their own
experiences, beliefs and social imprints to evaluate their current situation. As such, we see
various ‘structural constraints’ on attitudes, beliefs and behaviour which have developed
through common social values exerting a measure of influence on well-being. As Fernandez
and Kulik (1981) note, "it is not my income that makes me happy, but rather a favourable
comparison between my income and others’". This is one explanation for the otherwise
astonishing observation that although real per capita incomes have quadrupled in the past
50 years, in most advanced economies, aggregate levels of subjective well-being have remained
essentially unchanged. This is the widely-cited empirical observation known as the ‘Easterlin
paradox’2, which provides a justification for our multilevel approach since changes in mean
covariates such as mean incomes across a region might have little eﬀect on well-being whereas
large changes in individual incomes relative to the regional average could contribute much
more.
When we consider the nature of the survey data most commonly collected these days,
measures for subjective well-being (well-being as defined by the individual herself) using
relatively simple self-rating questions about happiness and life satisfaction are significantly
more reliable as a means for disclosing an individual’s state. Paying greater attention to
subjective well-being and to the formalisation of models of healthy behaviour through the
lifespan could have significant implications for social intervention and even economic policy,
with the motivation behind such scrutiny being the belief that investigating an individual’s
perceived resources and quality of life can actually help promote their subjective well-being
and social integration.
Studies on subjective well-being derive from two main perspectives: hedonism and eu-
daimonia. The former is roughly expressed as the human desire for pleasure, while the latter
refers to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, which is the human desire for overall ful-
fillment - covering such themes as self-actualisation and a commitment to socially-shared
goals. According to Aristotle, the hierarchy of human purposes aims at eudaimonia as the
ultimate goal. It constitutes rational activity which manifests the virtues of character, in-
cluding courage and honesty; the intellectual virtues, such as rationality in judgment; and
mutually beneficial relationships and scientific knowledge.
It is this distinction between happiness (‘hedonism’) and life satisfaction (‘eudaimonia’)
as constituents of well-being, which we seek to explore in this paper. Hedonism is considered
a more immediate human response whereas life satisfaction, in the eudaimonic sense, refers
to a more collectively motivated mindset, i.e. the individual not only maximises personal
pleasure or pain, but also considers social spillovers and a type of social goal congruence
in his actions. In addition, self-ratings of ‘happiness’ tend to reflect short-term, situation-
dependent expressions of mood, whereas self-ratings of ‘life satisfaction’ appear to measure
longer-term, more projectual evaluations, indicating the extent to which one’s experiences
2See, for example, Easterlin (1974) and, on modern data, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).
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match one’s expectations (Huppert, Baylis, and Keverne (2005)). Both are broadly consistent
measures, but can be considered separately as inputs into subjective well-being.3
To further enrich our analysis, this work adopts a set of classifications for the factors
influencing well-being beyond the simple binomial system of hedonism and eudaimonia.
This classification of explanatory variables begins with the concept of personal feelings, i.e.
hedonistic aspects of well-being such as pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, as well as the
eudaimonic aspects of well-being, such as competency, interest or engagement, meaning or
purpose in life (Huppert, Baylis, and Keverne (2005)). Twinned with this is the notion of
inter-personal feelings, which characterises the quality of interactions with others (Elliott
and Umberson (2004); Huppert, Baylis, and Keverne (2005)). In addition, we distinguish
between a further pair of concepts: personal functioning, which describes how much control
individuals have over their lives and the extent to which they perceive their activities as
having purpose, and inter-personal functioning - what the individual does for other people
or for their community in terms of pro-social behaviour (Helliwell and Putnam (2005)).
Variables that come under the middle two headings are considered central to an overall sense
of well-being (Ryﬀ (1989); Ryﬀ and Singer (1998); Seligman (2002)). Collectively, however,
we treat these factors as exogenous social interaction eﬀects, as the variables that come
under these four groupings are taken from subjective survey data and therefore represent
the extent to which individuals consider themselves connected or disconnected from their
peers and local institutions, due to a variety of external as well as personal factors. Afterall,
as our title suggests, ‘no man is an island’ and we seek to test whether these social interaction
eﬀects are strongest at the regional, national or at the individual level.
In addition to these social interactions, we also consider intrinsic social indicators as
possible determinants of well-being, e.g. marital status, monthly earnings, and the level of
education. These variables are intrinsic in that they are given for each individual interviewed
in the survey and thus represent inherent descriptive elements of their current economic or
social status. Finally, we introduce exogenous contextual factors, which account for the
external characteristics of the respective regional and national groups that each individual
belongs to, e.g. regional GDP and the geographical location of the region.
Therefore, in light of the preceding discussion on the concept of well-being and its trans-
lation into a suitable set of variables, the aim of the paper is twofold: more generally, to
understand the determinants of well-being across European regions using a set of social and
structural indicators at the national and regional level, as well as individual measures, drawn
from the data collected by Eurostat and the European Social Survey (ESS); more specifi-
cally, to apply multilevel modelling techniques to assess the role of regional factors and social
interactions in determining the well-being of individuals across European regions. We hope
to model and test for the determinants of happiness and life satisfaction, and therefore ul-
3Other well-being researchers have adopted diﬀerent approaches. For example, Seligman (2002) defines
well-being as the combination of an hedonistic component (pleasure) and two eudaimonic components
(engagement and meaning). For Ryﬀ (1989) well-being comprises six eudaimonic elements: autonomy,
environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relationships, purpose in life and self-acceptance.
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timately subjective well-being, and, using this information, arrive at an assessment of the
determinants of well-being across the EU-15 regions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes a small socio-geographic model
of well-being where the emergence of socio-geographic groupings is the results of individual
decisions based on social interactions. This model represents the theoretical a-priori justifi-
cation for the multilevel empirical model introduced in section three. Section four illustrates
how the notion of social interactions can be modelled using a multilevel empirical framework.
On the basis of these backgrounds, sections five and six discuss the dataset and the empirical
results. Section seven concludes.
2 A Socio-Geographic Model of Well-Being
In order to support the material presented in this paper, we develop a small model of regional
social clustering which borrows from Akerlof (1997)’s paper on social distance.4 We aim
to use this model to obtain an a priori theoretical justification for the analysis which is
undertaken in the subsequent sections of the paper, whereby multilevel modelling is used
to judge whether regional factors play a significant role in determining the well-being of
individuals across the EU. The key concept is that there are certain features of social position
(or ‘location’) that can be expected to aﬀect subjective well-being.5
Akerlof began by distributing individuals randomly along the real line in one-dimensional
space. Using a simple two-period framework he went on to show that an individual’s choice of
location on the line was determined by a mixture of both the ‘intrinsic’ value of the location
and the expected benefits from social exchange, i.e. the benefits gained due to proximity
with one’s neighbours. These two components are captured in a utility function, U , for each
individual which is maximised so as to determine the direction of their movement in the
following period along the real line.
U =
A
f (x0,i − x0,j)| {z }
Inherited Social Position
f (x1,i − x0,j)| {z }
Social Distance
+
£
−ax21,i + bx1,i + z + wi
¤| {z }
IntrinsicValue
(1)
where A is a constant of proportionality, and a and b are arbitrary constants. The first
subscript denotes time zero and one, while the second is an index for the individual, i =
1, 2, 3, ..., N .
4Akerlof’s model developed the ideas of the traditional gravity model from physics, as had been applied
to the theory of international trade before. In the latter case, trade between two countries is proportional to
their GNPs and inversely proportional to the square of their distance. This implied that the benefits from
trade would increase as distance approaches.
5We do not pursue Krugman’s theories (Krugman (1991a); Krugman (1991b); Krugman (1992); Krugman
(1993)) on dynamic spatial economies, as we wish to abstract from the issue of increasing returns to scale as
a source for the agglomeration of economic activity. Instead, we wish to concentrate on why social clusters
form, and why the composition of such clusters could in turn influence individual well-being. As such we
would like to develop a simple model which could suggest why intra-regional factors are more significant on
individuals than inter-regional factors.
5
Figure 1: The Emergence of Social Groupings based on Social Interactions in One-
Dimensional Space.
The first term is the expected benefit from social interactions and is the key term in
emphasising the motive for movement towards a particular neighbour - as the distance be-
tween individuals i and j decreases the benefits increase significantly. Therefore this term is
paramount in accounting for gains from proximity to others. In terms of the components of
well-being - happiness and life satisfaction - this term expresses our hypothesis that social
interaction eﬀects, e.g. trust in one’s neighbours, exert a significant eﬀect on individual
well-being to a greater extent than other exogenous elements. The second term in the utility
function (1) is used to represent the ‘intrinsic’ value of an individual’s choice of location.
This could depend on the various exogenous geographical, institutional and political factors,
z, which we later term as exogenous contextual factors, e.g. the quality of government, as
well as a set of individual socio-demographic indicators, wi, as described briefly in the in-
troduction. Therefore, the first term in (1) represents a distortion on the choice of location
which otherwise would have been purely determined on the basis of exogenous contextual
and individual factors - which Akerlof refers to as a ‘social optimum’ and which we will
discuss briefly below.
This model helps us understand the drivers behind regionalisation as it appears to be
the most appropriate for justifying the ex post formation of regional groupings by suggesting
that they exert relatively stronger eﬀects on their populations. One of the strengths of this
model is indeed in allowing for such a rich interpretation of movement across regions. In the
case of Akerlof’s model, the EU could be envisaged as a horizontal real line (see Figure 1).
Along this version of the real line we can imagine that we have N individuals spaced along it
at random locations, x0,1, x0,2, ..., x0,N ∈ X and X ∈ R, where X is the set of all individuals
along the real line.6
At some point along the line there is some form of social or continental optimum which
serves as the reference point for all social exchanges.7 In our regional example we could
view such an optimum as a reference location where we find that the largest concentration
6See Appendix A for similar figure in a two-dimensional context.
7Akerlof’s notion of an optimum suggests that any proximate movement is sub-optimal. However, given
the utility function specified such a move is indeed optimal, assuming that an individual’s well-being increases
with proximity.
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Figure 2: A One-Dimensional Representation of Socio-Geographic Clustering in Spain.
of people settle.8 For example, certain parts of Europe might be optimally located for access
to all regions. However, other than serving as the global optimum to the N optimisation
problems, there is no need to provide an interpretation as it will only serve as a point of
attraction to those individuals closest to it.
The most important implication of this model is that proximity to certain individuals
exerts the greatest eﬀect on social and geographical movement. At the most basic level these
movements by individuals are described in Akerlof’s model as being motivated by an actual
‘need’ for greater proximity with one’s neighbours, but we take such needs for proximity as
a proxy for the socio-economic, cultural and linguistic factors which have driven individuals
into the present-day regional groupings we find across Europe. As such we obtain some
form of justification that regions (corresponding to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units,
or NUTS, classifications) could indeed have stronger eﬀects on the individuals that make up
their populations and that strong interaction eﬀects can be identified within those regional
populations. We could therefor expect a greater degree of dependence within these groups.
As was noted before, these ideas are supported in certain branches of psychology and
suggest that we can therefore expect a priori some form of dependence between individuals
who share the same regional location. The existence of social and cultural norms can ulti-
mately be seen as the social and geographical confluence of individuals who are collocated
in the same region. All this would ultimately be the theoretical translation of the works
reviewed in the introduction that individuals are more responsive to those closest to them.
As an example, as Figure 2 shows, we consider two of the regions in Spain, East (Este)
and South (Sur), at the NUTS1 level in a linear setting, which is then is subdivided further
at the NUTS2 level into distinct principalities. Our model of social and geographic distance
can therefore be shown to yield regional groups which over time have lead, if somewhat
arbitrarily, to the statistical regions that have been applied to the 25 members of the EU.
Our next step is to extend Akerlof’s model into two dimensions. This allows us to capture
8In Akerlof’s model this was interpreted as some sort of socially optimal level of education.
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both the eﬀects of social distance and geography as reasons for individuals clustering into
separate regions. Specifically, we augment the objective function for individual i to include
two choice variables which represent the individual’s choice of spatial coordinates9. Thinking
in terms of a standard Cartesian coordinate system with both an x-axis and y-axis allows
us to imagine individuals choosing their social location in a geographical sense, with their
choice being aﬀected once again by issues of social exchange as in Akerlof’s one-dimensional
case. The objective function is now as follows:
Ui =
X
i6=j
A
(B + (x0,i − x0,j)2) (C + (x1,i − x0,j)2)
+
£
−ax21,i + bx1,i
¤
(2)
+
X
i6=j
E
(F + (y0,i − y0,j)2) (G+ (y1,i − y0,j)2)
+
£
−cy21,i + dy1,i
¤
+ z + wi
where (x0,i, y0,i) denotes the coordinates for individual i in two-dimensional space in period
0. In the above expression, (x0,i − x0,j) and (y0,i − y0,j) denote inherited social positions in
two-dimensional space and (x1,i − x0,j) and (y1,i − y0,j) are the social distances from one’s
neighbours. Therefore this allows us to motivate the model as one where a combination
of these types of distances help to determine geographical groupings of individuals across
Europe.
In addition we extend the model by motivating the idea of individuals being ‘close’ as
being unhindered by significant barriers (e.g. administrative, linguistic or cultural) such
that any form of movement towards a particular individual or group is feasible only if such
obstacles are absent - this prohibited movement could be represented as some sort of limit for
movement in a particular direction (e.g. choice of x1,i not greater than a certain threshold).
We are therefore able to account for the cases where individuals who would tend to cluster
together geographically are then somehow arbitrarily assigned to certain groups, such as
regions, due to administrative and natural barriers. We provide a proof of the results of
spatial collocation in a two-dimensional setting and with barriers to movement in Appendix
A.
We illustrate our two-dimensional extension with the following diagrams. As we can see
in Figure 3, the EU could be envisaged in x−y space with N individuals scattered at random
locations with coordinates (x0,1, y0,1), (x0,2, y0,2)..., (x0,N , y0,N) ∈ (X,Y ) andX,Y ∈ R, where
X and Y are the sets of all individuals along the x-axis and y-axis respectively.
As we did before, we can also show a multilevel representation of the socio-geographic
clusters. Figure 4 shows the three level approach which is taken in this paper and developed in
the later sections. We have individuals clustered into regions, which are themselves grouped
into countries. In this way we can simply characterise the eﬀects on clustering of the various
exogenous social interactions and contextual eﬀects, as well as the social indicators, which
were mentioned above.
9We have replaced U with W to denote specifically well-being.
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Figure 3: The Emergence of Social Groupings based on Social Interactions in Two-
Dimensional Space.
3 A Role for Multilevel Modelling
As we have information at the European sub-regional and individual level we have assessed
the determinants of well-being using a multilevel modelling approach. Multilevel modelling
originated in the fields of educational research and epidemiology, emphasising the role of
hierarchical dependence10. For example, in a typical household survey dataset, alongside
an individual identifier, there may exist a number of additional flags representing household
characteristics, residence by census tract, residence by region and so on. The principal issue
here is that individual behaviour is determined by a combination of individual characteristics,
together with the influence of household structure, residence, peer groups and other groupings
eﬀects. This implies that the group and its members can both influence and be influenced
by the composition of the group (Goldstein (1998)).
Alongside the nested structure of the hierarchical data, increasing attention has been paid
to diﬀerent forms of interactions and externalities in the hierarchical system (Durlauf (2003),
Manski (2000), Brock (2001)). For example, Durlauf (2004) analyses the determinants of
poverty traps to show how the persistence in economic status is generated by group-level
influences on individuals. The importance of such externalities has led researchers to define
10Over the past decade there has been a development of methods which have enabled researchers
to model hierarchical data. Examples of these methods include multilevel models (see, for example,
Goldstein (1998)), random coeﬃcient models (Longford (1993)) and hierarchical multilevel models
proposed by Goldstein (1986) based on iterative generalized least squares (IGLS).
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Figure 4: A Two-Dimensional Representation of Socio-Geographic Clustering in Spain show-
ing three levels: Individual, Region and Country.
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diﬀerent concepts of membership and neighbourhood eﬀects as those relying on notions of
distance in social space analysed in the previous section (Akerlof (1997)).
There are a number of advantages of this approach. First, in standard unilevel OLS
regression the presence of nested groups of observations may be handled by using dummy
variables. However, this approach breaks down when there are a large number of levels
resulting in a reduction in degrees of freedom. Second, this approach helps to analyse the
eﬀect of heterogenous groups in small samples. It is now widely recognised (Gosh and Rao
(1994)) that survey estimates for small areas, for example, are likely to yield unacceptably
large standard errors due to the smallness of sample size. Given the nature of our data, the
proposed hierarchical multilevel method, which is sample size dependent, seems to have a
distinct advantage over other methods in solving the bias.
Recognition of the diﬀerent forms of interaction between variables which aﬀect each indi-
vidual unit of the system and the groups they belong to has important empirical implications.
In fact, the assumption of independence is usually incorrect when data are drawn from a
population with a grouped structure. The existence of grouping adds a common element to
otherwise independent errors, thereby generating correlated within-group errors. Moulton
(1986) examines the precision of regression estimates derived from grouped data and finds
that it is usually necessary to account for the grouping either in the stochastic structure of
the errors or in the specification of the regressors. It is also possible that errors between-
groups will be correlated. For example, if the groups are geographical regions, as in our
dataset, then neighbouring regions display greater similarity than regions that are distant.
Moulton (1990) shows that incorrectly using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, even
with a small level of correlation, will lead to standard errors with substantial downward bias
and dangers of spurious findings of statistical significance.11
Such group interactions should be properly modeled; they can be modeled either as fixed
or random eﬀects and in deciding which is the right approach particular attention should
be devoted to the understanding of the survey methods used to generate the sample. A
stratification method (Deaton (1997)) eﬀectively converts a sample from one population
into a sample from many populations and guarantees that there will be observations to
permit estimates for all the geographical subgroups. If the data are grouped by area with
all areas represented in the sample then a fixed eﬀects specification is appropriate; this is
often modelled in the mean equation through additive or multiplicative dummy variables
and mean covariates.12 We will examine in the next section how such a specification may in
fact characterise more complex interaction eﬀects in the hierarchical structure.
11Once we adjust for this dependence, the degrees of freedom will fall thereby increasing estimated standard
errors, and correcting the downward bias resulting from the use of OLS estimation.
12When only some of the areas are represented in the sample or the pattern of dependence is unknown
spatial eﬀects can be accommodated in a hierarchical model through the error term by allowing for an
unrestricted non-diagonal covariance matrix.
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Figure 5: Diagrammatic Representation of a 3-level Model with Exogenous Contextual and
Social Interactions Eﬀects and Intrinsic Socio-Demographic Indicators
3.1 A Diagrammatic Representation
In light of the multilevel framework discussed in the preceding section, it is useful to un-
derstand the role of multilevel modelling in facilitating our analysis. As we are interested
in the eﬀect of individual, regional and national factors on the members of the various sub-
populations, this particular branch of statistical testing is an obvious choice. A useful way
to think about multilevel sampling for the case of a three-level model is described in Figure
5. The broken horizontal lines delineate the three levels: below the bottom two lines are the
‘micro-levels’ (regional or level-two and individual or level-one) and above the first line is the
‘macro-level’ (national or level-three). In this particular paper we are interested in the eﬀect
of ‘level-three’ variables Zk, and Xk, and ‘level-two’ variables, Zjk and Xjk, on the (micro)
‘level-one’ variable, Yijk, while controlling for other level-one variables, Xijk and Wijk.
Even if we were interested only in the eﬀects of Xjk on Xk at the lower macro-level (or
level-two), as long as these variables are not directly observable we would require two-stage
sampling, e.g. Xjk and Xk measured as the average of the micro-level units across clusters,
Xijk. This is the the case a fortiori for variables which might explicitly be defined as the
the aggregate of micro-level data from the outset.
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4 Modelling Social Exchange in Multilevel Models
We now show how the eﬀects of individual social exchange within the same group, as high-
lighted in the model developed in section two, can be modelled econometrically using simple
interaction eﬀects in a multilevel framework, as shown in Figure 5. An attractive feature
of the proposed method is that it is possible to identify social interactions in a way that is
robust to the presence of group-level heterogeneity (Brock (2001))13.
Specifically, we wish to show how we can translate the theoretical model of section two
into a testable empirical relation. In order to transform the theoretical model appropriately,
we will concentrate on the two distinct parts of the ‘well-being function’ and reinforce our
earlier discussion that the theoretical basis for considering social distance lends itself natu-
rally to the concepts of multilevel modelling. As a result we will look at the two constituent
parts of our well-being function:
Y = Expected Benefits from Social Exchange + Intrinsic Value (3)
We choose to denote the diﬀerent components of well-being (utility) by Y , as they are now
the dependent variables in our regressions.
For modelling the expected benefits from social exchange, we would be interested to cap-
ture as many of the social interaction eﬀects as possible. Manski (1993) listed three such
eﬀects which should ideally be considered when considering individual behaviour in a group
context: endogenous eﬀects, exogenous (contextual) eﬀects, and correlated eﬀects. Endoge-
nous eﬀects occur when the behaviour of the individual tends to vary with the prevalence of
the behavior in their group. Exogenous eﬀects occur when the individual’s behaviour tends
to be aﬀected by the underlying characteristics of the group (or region) that they belong to,
which have been exogenously determined. Finally, correlated eﬀects occur when individuals
in the same group tend to behave similarly because they share similar individual characteris-
tics, e.g. ability, propensity to be happy, etc. Typically the latter eﬀects are unobserved and
so the only eﬀects that can be explicitly controlled for are the endogenous and exogenous
interactions eﬀects, though we consider measures for excess variance that could account for
the unobservable correlated group eﬀects.
Therefore, in order to capture these eﬀects, we would be interested to include in our rela-
tion terms which can account for the relative social distances of the individuals within each
group, i.e. we would like our dependent variables, happiness and life satisfaction, to depend
on their respective group means, as well as the deviations of individuals’ characteristics from
13Typical examples of interaction-based models are the emergence of social networks or social norms.
Other influences are the so called peer influence eﬀects which have been examined in the psychology literature
(Brown (1990) and Brown, Clasen, and Eicher (1986)). Other forms of social interactions are role models, in
which the aspiration of a student are aﬀected by the observed education/occupation outcomes among adults
in his group (Streufert (1991)); imitation eﬀects in consumption preferences where, for example, preferences
depend on the observed consumption of neighbors (Bell (1995)). The role of herd behaviour and informational
cascades, where agents attempt to learn more by observing the behaviour of others (Bikhchandani and
Hirschleifer (1992)).
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their respective group means. These deviation scores should capture on average their social
positions relative to their neighbours. The first part of the regression relation in a two-level
model would ideally therefore take the form
Yij = f
¡
Y¯j,
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢¢
(4)
where Y¯j denotes the average at the group level for the dependent variable and X¯j denotes
the average at the group level for the explanatory variables, which would include the various
social interaction eﬀects we are interested in. In a three-level setting we would expect to
include means at both the regional level (groups denoted by j) and the national level (groups
denoted by k)
Yijk = f
¡
Y¯jk, Y¯k,
¡
Xijk − X¯jk
¢
,
¡
X¯jk − X¯k
¢¢
(5)
Therefore a possible regression relation could take a linear form
Yijk = α0 + α1Y¯jk + α2Y¯k + α3
¡
Xijk − X¯jk
¢
+ α4
¡
X¯jk − X¯k
¢
(6)
However, as highlighted by Manski (1993), this type of relationship suﬀers from a reflection
problem14 and a lack of identification (see Appendix B).
Therefore to specify the relation correctly, as well as allowing for some form of endogenous
regional and national eﬀects, we take the following steps. Let us consider once again a simple
two-level model where level-one, captured by the subscript i, represents individuals and level-
two, denoted by j, corresponds to regions. We start with the direct individual relationship
as follows
Yij = δ0 + δ1Xij + eij (7)
In this equation, eij represents individual heterogeneity, is assumed to be standard normal,
and satisfies E [eij | Xij] = 0. Yij is our dependent variable, and Xij is a set of individual
characteristics. Therefore, this is the simple regression of the relevant dependent variable on
the individual’s corresponding social attributes. We can transform this relation by taking
the average of the micro-level units across groups to obtain the between-group regression
Y¯j = α0 + α1X¯j + νj (8)
where α1 is the between-group regression coeﬃcient. However, as we are also interested
in the regression of the within-group deviation scores, we can also consider the following
regression within a particular group:¡
Yij − Y¯j
¢
= γ1
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢
+ ij (9)
where γ1 the within-group regression coeﬃcient. This regression, once rearranged, allows
for the mean of the dependent variable to enter the relation with a fixed coeﬃcient of 1. In
14Manski (1993) writes about the ‘reflection problem’, whereby researchers are limited in their ability to
account for the full range of social interactions by taking account of the endogenous eﬀects of a particular
group on the individuals of that group, which are assumed to be modelled by including the mean of the
dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the regression equation.
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addition, once we substitute in for the group mean, Y j, we obtain the following multilevel
model in terms of means and deviation scores:
Yij = Y¯j + γ1
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢
+ ij
Yij = α0 + α1X¯j + γ1
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
+ νj + ij (10)
Therefore this would appear to be the relevant relation for capturing as many of the endoge-
nous and exogenous interactions eﬀects as possible.
For the sake of notational ease, we rewrite the above model with a more consistent set
of coeﬃcients:
Yij = β0j + β1Xij + β2
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
+ uij (11)
whereby the within-group regression coeﬃcient is now β1(= γ1), the between-group regres-
sion coeﬃcient is now β2(= α1), β0j is a group-specific intercept, and uij = νj + ij.
Continuing with the development of the model, we chose to introduce random intercepts
in addition to the inclusion of means and deviation scores. These intercepts are modelled as
follows:
β0j = β00 + β01Zj + u0j (12)
The random intercept shows that the heterogeneity across the level-two groups is explained
by a set of observable group characteristics, Zj and a random disturbance term, u0j. This
would imply that we were attempting to ‘explain’ the between-group variability (as captured
by the group-specific intercepts, β0j) by including a level-two covariate, Zj and a mean
intercept, β00, with u0j crucially representing the unobserved level-two eﬀects. In order to
complete this particular specification we define Σ1 ≡Var(uij) and Σ2 ≡Var(u0j), and make
the following assumptions:
uij | Xij ∼ N(0,Σ1) Cov(uij , ui0j) = 0, ∀i 6= i0
u0j | Xij ∼ N(0,Σ2) Cov(u0j, uij) = 0 .
The reduced form of the model therefore becomes
Yij = β00 + β01Zj + β1Xij + β2
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
+ u0j + uij (13)
and in terms of social interactions, we can interpret the coeﬃcients as follows: β1 is a
measure of the direct impact of the exogenous individual factors on individual well-being; β2
is the social multiplier associated with the exogenous group social interactions; β01 accounts
for the exogenous contextual factors, while u0j captures the unobservable correlated eﬀects,
with Σ2 providing a measure for them15. The endogenous social interaction eﬀects cannot
unfortunately be explicitly disentangled but are implicitly allowed for by the inclusion of the
mean covariates, as was highlighted in the derivation above. Equation (13) is the testable
counterpart of the first term in the right hand side of equation (3) at the start of this section.
15By allowing for the possibility that the conditional mean of group eﬀect and the individual eﬀect vary
with group size, Graham (2004) also allows for the possibility that endogenous contextual eﬀects may diﬀer
according to group size, being stronger in bigger regions.
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For the time being we chose to leave out random coeﬃcients and assumed that the within-
group coeﬃcients were the same across groups, at both the national and regional level. In
addition, to avoid further problems of endogeneity, we have chosen our exogenous contextual
factors, Zj, to ensure that they are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, Xij.
Finally we need to capture the intrinsic factors of choice of location on social exchange (the
second term on the right hand side of equation (3)). These were individual socio-demographic
characteristics which might have somehow determined proximity and corresponding levels of
happiness and life satisfaction in such a way as to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory
variables, Xij. These additional individual-level factors were included in an additive fashion
and denoted Wij. Their inclusion should ideally help to improve the power of our multilevel
model in explaining the regional and national determinants of well-being. Therefore the full
two-level model we are implementing takes the form
Yij = β00 + β01Zj + β1Xij + β2
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
+ β3Wij + u0j + uij (14)
In the Appendix D we show a generalisation of the two-level model to the three-level case.
Note that one objection to the estimation of (14) is that Xij and
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
may be
correlated. As noted also by Hannan and Burstein (1974), when the clusters involve natural
groupings, such as neighbourhoods, these groupings may be aﬀected by certain factors (char-
acterised by Xij) that could be correlated with some of the exogenous characteristics of the
group,
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
. Therefore membership does not tend to be random with respect to those
characteristics and a high correlation between Xij and
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
is expected. However,
we are considering the case where individuals who cluster together geographically are then
assigned to certain groups, such as regions and other administrative units. We expect them
to be more homogeneous due to frequent interactions with one other and through sharing
relevant ‘life experiences’. Hence membership could be random with respect to the exogenous
characteristics described by
¡
Xij −Xj
¢
and therefore we expect the unobservable correlated
eﬀects to have a greater eﬀect than these characteristics.
To identify such unobservable social interactions across groups we measure the excess
variance, defined as the ratio of the unconditional between-group and within-group variances
at the diﬀerent levels of the hierarchical structure (Graham (2004)). In the two-level case
this measure is:
EV =
Σ2
Σ1
.
Without social interactions (β2 = 0) the reduced form simplifies to the one-way error
component model:
Yij = β00 + β01Zj + β1Xij + β3Wij + u0j + uij (15)
that could represent the social optimum without social-exchange as identified by Akerlof
(1997). Therefore the eﬀect of social interactions is to generate excess between-group vari-
ance by magnifying the eﬀect of unobservable group-level factors, u0j and mean group char-
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acteristics, Xj, on outcomes through the social multiplier β2. Within a multilevel model it
is then easy to test for the diﬀerent forms of social exchange identified by Akerlof since we
could establish how the level of well-being of an individual is aﬀected by these observable
social interactions and by unobservable group-level eﬀects. The latter factors could be easily
identified by measuring the excess between-group variance after controlling for the exogenous
and individual characteristics of each group member (Graham (2004), Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman (2003)).
5 The Determinants of Regional Well-Being across Eu-
rope
Our regional dataset is derived primarily from the responses to the European Social Sur-
vey (ESS). This survey was developed to conduct a systematic study of changing values,
attitudes, attributes and behaviour patterns within European polities. Its aim is to feed
into key European policy debates, by measuring and explaining how people’s social values,
cultural norms and behaviour patterns are distributed, the way in which they diﬀer within
and between nations and regions, and the direction and speed at which they are changing.
The survey consists of a collection of core16 and rotating17 modules. The former is repeated
at each round of the survey and remains relatively constant between rounds, while the latter
modules are repeated at greater and varying intervals.
The problem, of course, with developing eﬀective indicators for such subjective and no-
tional concepts concerning the European social fabric is the absence of a comprehensive,
well-tested and analytically-powerful set of tools for measuring underlying values across na-
tions. Although the Eurobarometer, the European (and World) Values Surveys and the
International Social Survey Programme have all made major contributions, even their com-
bined lists of individual items and, more importantly their combined array of validated
scales, were not considered comprehensive enough for eﬀective policy formulation. Hence
the development of the ESS.
Specifically, the core components of the modules cover:
16These three categories make up sections A, B and C of the survey and as they form the core module,
responses to these questions are collected at each round. The rotational modules were omitted for the time
being. As there had only been two rounds at the time we started to collate the data, the diﬀerent sets of
rotational modules had only been used once on each round and not repeated (some asked in 2002 and others
asked in 2004).
17There have been three rounds thus far: Round 1 was completed in December 2002, Round 2 in December
2004 and Round 3 in December 2006. The rotating modules in Round 1 covered ‘Citizenship, Involvement
and Democracy’ and ‘Immigration’. Those in Round 2 were ‘Family, Work, and Well-being’; ‘Opinions on
Health and Care Seeking’, and ‘Economic Morality in Europe: Market Society and Citizenship’. The final
rotating modules in Round 3 were ‘Personal and Social Well-being: Creating indicators for a flourishing
Europe’ and ‘The Timing of Life: The organisation of the life course in Europe’. In addition the questions
were altered and rearranged between rounds which required careful matching to ensure the datasets contained
consistent and matching categorical variables.
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(i) People’s value orientations (their world views, including their religiosity, their socio-
political values and their moral standpoints)
(ii) People’s cultural/national orientations (their sense of national and cultural attach-
ment and their related feelings towards outgroups and cross-national governance)
(iii) The underlying social structure of society (people’s social positions, including class,
education, degree of social exclusion, plus standard background socio-demographic variables,
such as age, household structure, gender, etc., and a few questions about media usage that
help to identify the primary sources of people’s social and political knowledge).
The ESS data was complemented by a variety of other economic, socio-demographic and
geographical regional indicators which were obtained directly from the Study Programme on
European Spatial Planning (SPESP). For a complete variable list see Table 1. The individual
data extracted is grouped by NUTS18 regions (161 in 2004 and 182 in 2002).19 As a result the
variables employed in the analysis consist of a number of indicators divided into national,
regional and individual level variables. The individual responses are treated as level-one,
the NUTS1 and NUTS220 regions make up level-two, and the countries (NUTS0) make up
level-three, giving us a multilevel model with three levels.
In line with the multilevel structure in equation (14) we have identified a set of explana-
tory variables for each level. We have divided national variables into exogenous contextual
eﬀects comprising the country’s quality of government and average log per-capita income and
exogenous social interaction eﬀects comprising the average degree of religiosity, average trust
and the average political interest. All these variables are national averages from level-one
micro-units.
At the regional level the exogenous contextual factors comprise the geographical location
of the region and mean log per-capita income. The exogenous social interaction eﬀects
comprise the average degree of religion, average trust and the average political interest.
These variables are similarly derived as regional averages from level-one micro-units.
The individual level variables have been grouped under the heading of exogenous social
interaction and socio-demographic eﬀects and subdivided according to21:
(a) personal functioning/feelings comprising self-reported physical and mental health and
the degree of religiosity.
(b) inter-personal feelings, i.e. the trust in a country’s parliament, the police force, people
and the respondent’s perception of people’s level of altruism.
(c) inter-personal functioning, i.e. the level of social engagement, social intimacy and the
level of political involvement.
(d) social exclusion and socio-demographic factors comprising: ethnicity, citizenship,
marital status, educational level, victim of crime, employment status, gender and household
18For a similar treatment of NUTS data see Corrado, Martin, and Weeks (2005).
19The full list of NUTS regions used for the multilevel estimation is available on request.
20An important point to note is that due to the nature of the data, the regional breakdown across the
NUTS1 and NUTS2 definitions is not consistent, i.e. for some countries the survey data is reported on a
NUTS1 basis and for others on a NUTS2 basis.
21Following Elliott and Umberson (2004) and Huppert, Baylis, and Keverne (2005).
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income.
Table 1 provides a complete specification of the variables included in the regressions. In
addition, Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for these variables. Unsurprisingly the trust
variables are mildly correlated. However, the political variables (‘political interest’, ‘trust
in parliament’, etc.) are the most correlated with one another. Oddly, the variables ‘trust
in police’ and ‘victim of crime’ show close to zero correlation. On the whole the pairwise
correlations reveal that the explanatory variables are little correlated which reduces the risk
of multicollinearity in our results and helps to identify the composite parameters embedding
social interaction eﬀects in the multilevel model.
6 The Geography of Happiness and Life-satisfaction
across Europe
Before moving to the estimation section it is instructive to analyse the geography of happiness
and life-satisfaction in Europe by looking at some of the statistics from our dataset.
Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 report the regional average level of happiness and life satisfaction
in 2002 and 2004. Regions with a darker shade indicate higher levels of happiness and life
satisfaction, measured on a scale between zero and ten. The first thing to note is that in
general, the EU nations are relatively happy and satisfied with life, as can be seen from
the fact that only values of five and above are reported in the ESS. Looking at the actual
distribution, it appears that the levels of both happiness and life satisfaction are higher in
Northern Europe than in Central Europe and some of the Mediterranean regions. Traditional
stereotypes suggest that Europeans that hail from the warmer Mediterranean regions are
more content. However, our inspection of the data reveals that in fact the regions of North
and East France, Portugal and South Italy are on average the least satisfied and happy in
both waves. With particular regard to life satisfaction, West Germany, reports lower levels
in 2004, while in Northern Ireland and Southern France the level of life satisfaction has
increased in the intervening period. With respect to happiness, most regions in the UK
(except the Eastern regions), Central Spain and Austria report a lower level of happiness
between the two waves.
In addition, we have also organised the national averages for happiness and life satisfac-
tion, in the manner of country rankings for both 2002 and 2004 in Figure 11. If we turn
to these charts, we find that overall for both 2002 and 2004 Italy, Greece, Portugal, Ger-
many and France report the lowest levels of happiness whereas the Scandinavian Countries,
Netherlands and Luxembourg report the highest. A similar trend is found in life satisfaction.
We hope to understand what could be driving such relative diﬀerences in well-being across
the diﬀerent EU regions.
In fact, we might be able to shed some light on this matter by considering how the exoge-
nous contextual and social interaction eﬀects at the country level (Zk and X¯k respectively)
diﬀer across the EU-15. As Figures 12, 13 and 14 show the Northern EU countries (the
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Scandinavian members, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) are attaining the highest scores in
terms of quality of government, as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators, as
well as reporting the highest level of per capita income. Respondents also report the highest
level of trust in their respective parliaments, peoples, and laws, as enforced by their police
forces. Similarly they also report the highest level of political interest and perceived altruism.
The worst scoring countries in the majority of these categories are once again the Southern
European nations of Italy, Portugal and Greece, which could explain their relatively lower
levels of well-being.
In addition, we find that Portugal and the Scandinavian EU members have the highest
level of social engagement, while Greece, Italy, and Germany register the lowest. However,
these results are reversed when we turn to the reported level of social intimacy where Italy,
Belgium and France score the highest while Germany, Netherlands and Denmark the lowest.
This inverse relation between social intimacy and engagement, though not obvious, could
be explained by the diﬀering nature of social and familial bonds across diﬀerent parts of
Europe. If we consider Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, Northern Europe has traditionally
been representative of individualism, whereas individuals from Central and Southern Europe
are typified by the strong collectivist. Nevertheless, Germany stands out as the one country
that reports the lowest level of both social engagement and social intimacy.
In terms of average national religiosity, the Southern European nations dominate, with
Greece, Italy and Portugal scoring highly, while the Central and Northern European countries
such as Sweden, France and Luxembourg report religious belief to be far less prevalent. One
final point to make is that there is no obvious continental divide, as we have found up to
this point, when we look at average health across the EU-15. Portugal, Germany and Spain
report the highest levels of health, while Denmark, Ireland and Austria report the lowest
levels.
Having established a variety of interesting, if somewhat familiar, trends in our data for
the EU-15 countries, we now proceed to attempt to disentangle and identify the actual
determinants of both life satisfaction and happiness. As we have highlighted before, we want
to assess the role played by contextual (e.g. institutional) and social interaction eﬀects at
the national and regional level in explaining well-being at the individual level. As an input
to this analysis, we also consider the role played by individual intrinsic socio-demographic
characteristics in aﬀecting both life satisfaction and happiness. The next section estimates
a three-level model and discusses our main findings.
6.1 Estimation and Results
Following the three-level specification of equation (14) we define the following three-level
multilevel model:
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Yijk = β000+Zjkβ010+Zkβ001+
¡
Xijk − X¯jk
¢
β11 (16)
+
¡
X¯jk − X¯k
¢
β12+X¯kβ13+Wijkβ2+e0jk+e00k+eijk (17)
eijk ∼ N(0,Σ1), e0jk ∼ N(0,Σ2), and e00k ∼ N(0,Σ3)
where level-one denotes individual, level-two denotes regions and level-three denotes nations.
In equation (16) Yijk is our relevant measure of well-being; Xijk is the set of individual
social interactions - comprising personal and inter-personal feelings/functioning;Wijk is the
set of individual socio-demographic indicator variables;
¡
Xijk − X¯jk
¢
and
¡
X¯jk − X¯k
¢
are
the exogenous centred social interaction eﬀects at level-two and level-three, and Zjk and
Zk are the exogenous contextual factors at level-two and level-three. The last three terms
denote the random components at the individual, eijk, regional, e0jk and national, e00k,
levels. Finally, Σ1 = σ1I is the variance-covariance matrix for the level-one random eﬀects,
eijk; Σ2 = σ2I is the variance-covariance matrix for the level-two random eﬀects, e0jk, and
finally Σ3 = σ3I is the variance-covariance matrix for the level-three random eﬀects, e00k.
For the estimation of (16) we used a programme which has become commonplace across
statistics and biostatistics for implementing multilevel modelling, MLWiN, which implements
an Iterative Generalized Least Squares (IGLS) method22. The procedure is briefly set out in
the Appendix E.
Given the problems highlighted in section four, we are interested in understanding the role
played by the exogenous group eﬀects as well as by correlated group eﬀects. The presence of
unobservable group eﬀects can be identified by measuring the excess variance, defined as the
ratio of the unconditional between-group and within-group variances at the diﬀerent levels
of the hierarchical structure (Graham (2004)):
EV32 =
Σ3
Σ2
; EV21 =
Σ2
Σ1
.
Table 3 reports the multilevel linear estimation results for waves 2002 and 2004 of the ESS
for our dependent variables happiness (taken as a proxy for short-term well-being) and life
satisfaction (our proxy for long-term well-being). However, it is important to bear in mind,
that the choice of specific concepts within the field of well-being, and the choice of specific
items to measure these concepts has proved to be a major challenge as a consensus has
not yet developed among psychologists about the components of well-being or what would
constitute the ‘gold standard’ for measuring well-being. In addition, as the distributions
show, the two categorical dependent variables are approximately normally distributed. So
following Helliwell and Putnam (2005) we have transformed both variables to Normal scores
22We employ a Restricted Iterative Generalized Least Squares (RIGLS) method. One advantage of the
latter method is that, diﬀerently from Iterative Generalized Least Squares, estimates of the variance com-
ponents take into account the loss of the degrees of freedom resulting from the estimation of the regression
parameters. Hence, while the IGLS estimates for the variance components have a downward bias, the RIGLS
estimates do not.
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and use linear multilevel estimates23. For each response category, this transformation assigns
the value from the inverse of the Standard Normal (0, 1) cumulative distribution for the
estimated proportion of respondents from the dependent variable’s original distribution24.
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Looking first at the estimation results for our short-term measure of well-being, reported
subjective happiness, we find that a number of our level-three, level-two and level-one vari-
ables are significant, which suggests immediate support for our hypothesis that both regional
and national factors have eﬀects on an individual’s well-being. In terms of the original aim
of the paper, we are interested to verify whether, out of those coeﬃcients that are significant
at the national and regional level on the same variables, the following conditions hold
β12 > β13 and β010 > β001
where β12 is the vector of coeﬃcients on the regional social interaction eﬀects, X¯jk; β13
is the vector of coeﬃcients on the national social interaction eﬀects, X¯k; β010 is vector of
coeﬃcients on the regional contextual eﬀects, Zjk, and β001 vector of coeﬃcients on the
national contextual eﬀects, Zk. That is, do we find that regional factors have a greater eﬀect
on an individual’s well-being as opposed to the national position, e.g. does regional average
trust in people aﬀect well-being more than the corresponding national average?
Out of the regional and national factors we find that in 2002 that there are far more
regional contextual and social interaction eﬀects than national eﬀects which are significant.
23An alternative way would be to use multinomial ordinal probit estimation, which returns the eﬀects on
the underlying latent index. Indeed, the next stage for extending the modelling framework is to incorporate
a latent response formulation. There are a number of references in this area which we plan to apply, e.g.
Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004). Nevertheless, as shown by Helliwell and Putnam (2005), linear estimates
for well-being were equivalent to such probit estimation and much easier to analyse.
24The Normal score transformation is defined as:
s = φ
µ
r
n+ 1
¶
where s is the normal score for an observation, r is the rank for that observation, n is the sample size and
φ(p) is the p-th quantile from the standard normal distribution (see Conover (1999)).
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In 2004, we find that the number of regional factors that are significant are only marginally
greater than those at the national level. For example, in 2002, we find that the level of
happiness is aﬀected by one of our key economic indicators - regional GDP - as well as
the regional averages of trust in the local police force, of political interest, religiosity and
altruism, whereas only average political interest is significant at the national. There is only
one variable for which both the regional and national averages are significant, which is in
the case of average political interest in the multilevel regression of happiness in 2002. In
this instance, we do find that β12 > β13, which implies that the degree of political interest
at the regional level exerts a stronger eﬀect and is therefore more important in determining
the level of happiness as compared with the national average political interest. In 2004, we
find that individual happiness is aﬀected by a wider mix of national and regional variables,
which overlap only in the case of two variables (social intimacy and altruism). In the case
of social intimacy we actually find that β12 < β13, i.e. the regional eﬀect is weaker than the
national eﬀect, but the desired relation is confirmed when we look at regional and national
altruism. However, despite these findings at the second and third levels of the data, the
results suggest that, overall, regional and national forces are far less important relative to
each individual’s intrinsic attributes and social position.
In fact, the 2004 results suggest that the hypothesis that regional factors are more impor-
tant to individual short-run well-being than national aggregates, as typified by the majority
of data collated by national governments, is not as robust as we would have expected. How-
ever, they do hold strongly for 2002. This could suggest the presence of some form of shift
in behaviour between the two surveys, something which requires further analysis. We are
currently integrating the 2006 data to see whether it replicate the trends of 2002 or 2004 or
whether that data has its own unique results. Nevertheless, in 2004, despite national aver-
ages not being less important than regional variables, it is certainly not the case that they
are any more important. In fact, as was expected, the estimation results suggest that it is
indeed primarily individual intrinsic eﬀects and a certain degree of unobservable correlated
group eﬀects that drive the levels of well-being across the EU-15. To further analyse this
point we move to the analysis of level-one variables.
Looking at exogenous social interaction eﬀects the degree of religiosity raises happiness.
Inter-personal feelings, i.e. the quality of interactions with others, as measured by social
intimacy and engagement, are also important. In addition, individuals who are relatively
more confident in their country’s institutions, who trust people more and who perceive
society to be altruistic, report a higher level of happiness.
The intrinsic socio-demographic indicators included in the estimation were household
income and a variety of dichotomous variables. These variables were introduced to establish
whether descriptive factors such as the respondents’ level of schooling or marital status were
also significant in explaining happiness. The eﬀects of income are significant only for the
highest income levels and these income levels have a positive eﬀect, as would be expected.
We also found negative eﬀects from being unemployed. However, the level of education did
not appear to be significant, whereas marital status was significant only for those individuals
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who were in some form of relationship (cohabiting or married). With respect to the eﬀect of
the respondent’s age we appear to recover the familiar inverted U-shaped relation between
happiness and age. We find that younger and older individuals are happier than those who
are middle-aged.
The socio-demographic variables related to social inclusion are also important. We find
that respondents who are citizens of the country where they reside and who do not belong
to ethnic minorities, report higher levels of happiness. Also, for 2002, respondents who have
been a victim of crime report lower levels of happiness, which would be expected.
When we turn to the estimates for our longer-term measure of well-being, reported sub-
jective life satisfaction, we find that, in 2002, significant national exogenous factors, both
contextual and interactions-based, are completely absent. However, in 2004 we find that
more national and regional averages are significant though we retain the same degree of
relative importance between them. In addition, the significance of the regional averages
is once again marginally more prevalent. For 2004, this greater level of significance (rela-
tive to the 2004 happiness estimation results) could be explained by viewing national and
regional averages as a useful indicator of not only current moods and mindsets, but also
future trends, since social and cultural ‘norms’, as captured by these averages, take time to
develop and eventually to diminish. Therefore they could exert a slightly greater influence
on our projectual measure of well-being, i.e. life satisfaction. If we were to include data
from surveys of expectations, we might find far more significance among such variables - this
is indeed one extension we would like to carry out. For example in 2004, we find that the
regional averages such as those for health, the level of social intimacy and trust in police are
significant. And at the national level, we find that the level of religious belief and the levels
of social intimacies and engagement are all significant.
We also find that location becomes significant for life satisfaction in 2004, whereas it is
not relevant in the determination of happiness. This could be justified by appealing to the
case of geographical immobility as a long-term factor, such that individuals who are unable
to move easily out of particular locations could find that their location can indeed aﬀect
their long-term well-being. For example, looking at the size and magnitudes of coeﬃcients,
we find in 2004 that living on the Northern or Mediterranean regions of your country can
aﬀect one’s life satisfaction relatively more than if that individual lived elsewhere in their
country. This partially supports the idea that Mediterraneans should be happier, but as we
have seen this locational variable is not enough.
In addition, we find that the level-one variables are just as significant as in the case
of happiness. The magnitudes of certain level-one coeﬃcients are greater, such as that on
health, which is understandable given the longer-term eﬀects of the state of one’s health.
However, on balance, the level-one variables exert a much greater eﬀect on happiness than
life satisfaction, which supports our idea that the snapshots of society captured in each wave
have greater short-run implications than long-run.
If we look at the individual social interaction eﬀects, we find that several of these are
significant and share similar signs and magnitudes across 2002 and 2004. We see that the
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level of trust in parliament, police and people, as well as the perceived level of altruism, has
a strong positive eﬀect on life satisfaction. Similarly, individuals who report a high level of
social engagement and who are socially intimate with at least one other person are positively
aﬀected. Also respondents who report higher levels of health share strong positive eﬀects on
their life satisfaction. Moving on to the individual intrinsic socio-demographic factors, we
find again that younger and older individuals are more satisfied with life than those who are
middle aged.
As would be expected, the change in life satisfaction increased across income levels. On
the other hand, income was only significant for the highest income brackets and was is more
relevant in determining happiness than life satisfaction. There were also significant negative
eﬀects from being unemployed. Marital status was significant once again only for those
individuals who are cohabiting or married. Finally respondents who are citizens of their
country of residence and who do not belong to ethnic minorities once again report higher
levels of life satisfaction.
It is also worth briefly mentioning some of the particular diﬀerences in the regression
of happiness and life satisfaction. As certain inter-personal feelings and functioning have a
more projectual perspective, we would expect that they will aﬀect life satisfaction more than
happiness, which is what we find in the case of social engagement and certain trust variables,
e.g. trust in parliament and people. This can be seen by the relative size of the coeﬃcients.
An important point to note is that the relative magnitudes of those explanatory variables
that are significant do not change over the two waves. This suggests that the importance of
certain factors aﬀecting happiness and life satisfaction have not changed in the intervening
years, which would be expected given only a two year break between the waves of the survey
and the fact that the EU-15 are firmly entrenched in a period of relative stability and
prosperity.
Having controlled for all the social interactions eﬀects and intrinsic socio-demographic
factors, we now consider the presence of the unobservable correlated eﬀects that we discussed
in the previous sections. In general, as Table 3 shows, there is evidence of both between-
country variation, Σ3, and between-region variation, Σ2, suggesting the presence of spatially
proximate spillover eﬀects generated by unobservable eﬀects operating at the regional and
national levels.
There is also evidence of a relevant within-region heterogeneity across individuals, Σ1 in
all the four estimations reported. The high excess variance given by the ratio of between-
region variance, Σ2, and within-region variance, Σ1, shows that well-being is strongly de-
pendent on unobservable social interactions among individuals belonging to the same group.
And more importantly life satisfaction, i.e. the way each individual perceives his whole life
experience, is substantially more dependent on this latent measures of social exchange than
happiness is in 2002.
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7 Conclusion
With the emergence of social interactions and social exchange models (Manski (2000), Brock
(2001), Akerlof (1997)) research has gradually moved from a pure spatial definition of neigh-
bourhood towards a multidimensional measure based on diﬀerent forms of social distance
and interactions. Neglecting such interactions is likely to create problems of inference since
this adds a common element to otherwise independent errors.
This work extends the measurement of well-being across European regions in several
ways. First, using hierarchical data on well-being its adopts a three-stage multilevel model
incorporating a variety of eﬀects: exogenous contextual eﬀects at the regional and national
levels; a number of exogenous social interactions eﬀects at all three levels of the model, and
finally a series of intrinsic socio-demographic indicators at the individual micro-level.
Together with the excess between-group variance generated by social exchange and inter-
actions, these eﬀects are used to determine the face of individual well-being across the EU-15
nations. One of the main contributions of our empirical methodology is to show how social
interactions can be easily modelled in a multilevel setting. Empirical findings support the
idea that happiness and life satisfaction are strongly dependent on a variety of observable
social interactions within each group as well as on other contextual and intrinsic factors.
As one of the main focus in the European policy arena is social cohesion, this paper clearly
shows that social interactions are important for understanding well-being and subsequently
must be considered when developing adequate social and economic policies. For example,
among some of the more specific factors that we found to aﬀect well-being, e.g. diﬀerent
forms of trust, the implication was that it is important for policies somehow to engender
such trust if social cohesion is to be achieved.
The results in this paper are necessarily preliminary. Our aim is for this paper to form
the start of a much larger body of research which seeks to explore this growing area of
‘lifestyle analysis’, namely the use of economic and social indicators to understand the role
and eﬀects of current social, political and economic policies and institutions on individuals
across Europe. The third round of the ESS has recently been completed in December 2006
and once it is available we plan to integrate its findings into our work.
26
References
Aitkin, M., and N. T. Longford (1986): “Statistical Modelling Issues in School Eﬀectiveness
Studies (with Discussion),” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A, 149(1), 1—43.
Akerlof, G. A. (1997): “Social Distance and Social Decisions,” Econometrica, 65(5), 1005—1028.
Bell, A. (1995): “Dynamically Interdependent Preferences in a General Equilibrium Environ-
ment,” Mimeo (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University).
Bikhchandani, S., and I. Hirschleifer, D. and Welch (1992): “A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, 100,
992—1026.
Blanchflower, D., and A. Oswald (2004): “Wellbeing over Time in Britain and the USA,”
Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1359—1386.
Brock, W. A. and Durlauf, S. N. (2001): “Interactions-Based Models,” in Handbook of Econo-
metrics, ed. by J. J. Heckman, and E. Leamer, vol. 5, pp. 3297—3380, Amsterdam. Elsevier
Science, Volume 5.
Brown, B. (1990): “Peer Groups and Peer Cultures,” in At the Threshold, ed. by S. Feldman, and
G. Elliott, Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.
Brown, B., D. Clasen, and S. Eicher (1986): “Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity
Dispositions and Self-Reported Behavior Among Adolescents,” Developmental Psychology, 22,
521—530.
Campbell, A., P. Converse, and W. Rodgers (1976): The Quality of American Life. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Conover, W. (1999): Practical Nonparametric Statistics (3rd Edition). Wiley.
Corrado, L., R. Martin, and M. Weeks (2005): “Identifying and Interpreting Regional Con-
vergence Clusters Across Europe,” The Economic Journal, 115, C133—C160.
Deaton (1997): The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to Develop-
ment Policy. Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, Baltimore.
Duncan, O. D. (1975): “Does Money Buy Satisfaction?,” Social Indicators Research, 2, 267—274.
Durlauf, S. N. (2003): “Neighborhood Eﬀects,” in Hanbook of Regional and Urban Economics,
ed. by J. F. Henderson, J. V. and Thisse. North Holland, Vol. 4, Economics.
Durlauf, S. N. (2004): “Groups, Social Influences, and Inequality: A Memberships Theory
Perspective on Poverty Traps,” in Poverty Traps, ed. by S. Bowles, S. N. Durlauf, and K. Hoﬀ,
Princeton. Princeton University Press.
Easterlin, R. A. (1974): “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?,” in Nations and
Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, ed. by P. A. David,
and M. W. Reder. New York: Academic Press, Inc.
27
(1994): “The Birth Dearth, Aging, and the Economy: Where Have We Been and Where
Are We Going?,” in Human Capital and Economic Development, ed. by S. Asefa, and W. C.
Huang. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
(2003): “Explaining Happiness,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100,
11176—11183.
Elliott, S., and D. Umberson (2004): “Recent Demographic Trends in the US and Implications
for Wellbeing.,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Families, ed. by J. T. JL Scott,
and M. Richards. MA: Blackwell.
Fernandez, R. M., and J. C. Kulik (1981): “A Multilevel Model of Life Satisfaction: Eﬀects
of Individual Characteristics and Neighbourhood Composition,” American Sociological Review,
46, 840—850.
Glaeser, E. L., B. Sacerdote, and J. A. Scheinkman (2003): “The Social Multiplier,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3), 345—353.
Goldstein, H. (1986): “Multilevel Mixed Linear Model Analysis Using Iterative Generalised Least
Squares,” Biometrika, 73, 46—56.
(1989): “Restricted Unbiased Iterative Generalized Least-Squares Estimation,” Bio-
metrika, 76(3), 622—623.
Goldstein, H. (1998): “Multilevel Models for Analysing Social Data,” Encyclopedia of Social
Research Methods.
Goldtsein, H., and J. Rasbash (1992): “Eﬃcient Computational Procedures for the Estimation
of Parameters in Multilevel Models Based on Iterative Least Squares,” Computational Statistics
and Data Analysis, 13, 63—71.
Gosh, M., and J. N. Rao (1994): “Small Area Estimation: An Appraisal,” Statistical Science,
9(1), 55—93.
Graham, B. S. (2004): “Social Interactions and Excess Variance Contrasts: Identification, Es-
timation, and Inference with an Application on the Role of Peer Group Eﬀects in Academic
Achievement,” mimeo, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
Hannan, M. T., and L. Burstein (1974): “Estimation from Grouped Observations,” American
Sociological Review, 39, 374—92.
Hausman, J. A. (1978): “Specification Tests in Econometrics,” Econometrica, 46(6), 1251—71.
Helliwell, J., and R. D. Putnam (2005): “The Social Context of Well-Being,” in The Science
of Well-Being, ed. by A. Huppert, B. Keverne, and N. Baylis. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Huppert, F. A., N. Baylis, and B. Keverne (2005): The Science of Well-Being. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Krugman, P. (1991a): Geography and Trade. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
28
(1991b): “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,” Journal of Political Economy,
99(3), 483—499.
(1992): “A Dynamic Spatial Model,” NBER Working Paper No. 4219.
(1993): “First Nature, Second Nature, and Metropolitan Location,” Journal of Regional
Science, 33, 129—144.
Longford, N. T. (1993): Random Coeﬃcient Models. Claredon Press, London.
Lyubomirsky, S., K. Sheldon, and D. Schkade (2005): “Pursuing Happiness: The Architec-
ture of Sustainable Change,” Review of General Psychology, 9, 111—131.
Manski, C. F. (1993): “Identification of Endogenous Social Eﬀects: The Reflection Problem,”
Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 531—542.
(2000): “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions,” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 7580.
Moulton, B. R. (1986): “Random Group Eﬀects and the Precision of Regression Estimates,”
Journal of Econometrics, 32, 385—397.
(1990): “An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Eﬀects of Aggregate Variables on
Micro Unit,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(2), 334—338.
Ormel, J., S. Lindenberg, N. Steverink, and L. Verbrugge (1999): “Subjective Wellbeing
and Social Production Functions,” Social Indicators Research, 46, 61—90.
Ryff, C. (1989): “Happiness is Everything, or is It? Explorations on the Meaning of Psychological
Well-Being.,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1069—1081.
Ryff, C., and B. Singer (1998): “The Contours of Positive Human Health,” Psychological
Inquiry, 9(1), 1—28.
Seligman, M. (2002): Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your
Potential for Lasting Fulfilment. Free Press., New York.
Skrondal, A., and S. Rabe-Hesketh (2004): Generalised Latent Variable Modelling: Multilevel,
Longitudinal, and Structural Equation Models. Chapman Hall, CRC Press.
Streufert, P. (1991): “The Eﬀect of Underclass Isolation on Schooling Choice,” Mimeo (Univer-
sity of Wisconsin at Madison).
A Derivation of Results for the Socio-GeographicModel
In this Appendix we provide a simple extension of Akerlof’s model to the two-dimensional case.
We show how individuals move closer to one another in two-dimensional space, which provides a
better analogy for the socio-spatial regional clustering in Europe. This is in apposition to Akerlof’s
model which is based simply on the real line, i.e. one-dimensional space. We follow Akerlof in
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Figure 6: Simple 3-person Representation of a Two-Dimensional Extension to Akerlof’s
Model with Barriers to Movement.
assuming that there are three individuals randomly distributed in this two-dimensional space, at
three distinct sets of coordinates in x− y space (see Figure 6 below).
Our objective function summarises the 2 inputs into well-being, Yi for individual i: (1) benefits
from proximity and (2) the intrinsic benefits from one’s choice of location along both the x-axis
and y-axis, x1,i and y1,i.
Wi =
X
i6=j
A
(B + (x0,i − x0,j)2) (C + (x1,i − x0,j)2)
+
£
−ax21,i + bx1,i
¤
(A.1)
+
X
i6=j
E
(F + (y0,i − y0,j)2) (G+ (y1,i − y0,j)2)
+
£
−cy21,i + dy1,i
¤
+ z + wi
To simplify the model we have imposed a limit on the range of movement by adding a natural
barrier on the two axes at points xB and yB. In a model of 3 individuals this would mean that
for individual 1 we would only consider the ranges x1,1 < x0,2 and x0,2 < x1,1 < xB on the x-axis
and y1,1 < y0,2 and y0,2 < y1,1 < yB on the y-axis, when considering the parts of the line that
individual 1 is able to move to. Similarly individual 3 is restricted in his/her movement within the
range x1,3 > xB and y1,3 > yB since the barrier prevents any significant collocation with either of
the other individuals.
To determine the position of individual 1 along the x-axis, we diﬀerentiate with respect to
individual 1’s location in the following period, x1,1.
∂W1
∂x1,1
=
A
(B + (x0,1 − x0,2)2)
³
− 2(x1,1−x0,2)
(C+(x1,1−x0,2)2)2
´
+
A
(B + (x0,1 − xB)2)
³
− 2(x1,1−xB)
(C+(x1,1−xB)2)2
´
−2ax1,1+b = 0
(A.2)
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Similarly, to determine the position of individual 1 along the y-axis, we diﬀerentiate with respect
to individual 1’s location in the following period, y1,1.
∂W1
∂y1,1
=
E
(F + (y0,1 − y0,2)2)
³
− 2(y1,1−y0,2)
(G+(y1,1−y0,2)2)2
´
+
E
(F + (y0,1 − yB)2)
³
− 2(y1,1−yB)
(G+(y1,1−yB)2)2
´
−2cy1,1+d = 0
(A.3)
We repeat these calculations for individual 2 to obtain:
∂W2
∂x1,2
=
A
(B + (x0,2 − x0,1)2)
³
− 2(x1,2−x0,1)
(C+(x1,2−x0,1)2)2
´
+
A
(B + (x0,2 − xB)2)
³
− 2(x1,2−xB)
(C+(x1,2−xB)2)2
´
−2ax1,2+b = 0
(A.4)
∂W2
∂y1,1
=
E
(F + (y0,2 − y0,1)2)
³
− 2(y1,2−y0,1)
(G+(y1,2−y0,1)2)2
´
+
E
(F + (y0,2 − yB)2)
³
− 2(y1,2−yB)
(G+(y1,2−yB)2)2
´
−2cy1,2+d = 0
(A.5)
Looking at individual 1 in the range x1,1 < x0,2, we find that ∂W1∂x1,1 > 0 as both the first and
the second term will be positive. In the range x0,2 < x1,1 < xB the derivative ∂W1∂x1,1 < 0; this
occurs if the first term dominates the second. i.e. if x1,1 is much larger than x0,2. These results
are repeated precisely for the y-coordinates: in the range y1,1 < y0,2, we find that ∂W1∂y1,1 > 0 and
in the range y0,2 < y1,1 < yB the derivative ∂W1∂y1,1 < 0; this occurs if the first term dominates the
second. i.e. if y1,1 is much larger than y0,2. Therefore as utility is increasing when both x1,1 < x0,2
and y1,1 < y0,2 and decreasing when both x0,2 < x1,1 < xB and y0,2 < y1,1 < yB then individual
1 will switch his position with individual 2.
Moving on to individual 2, in the range x1,2 < x0,1 we find that ∂W2∂x1,2 > 0 as both the first and
the second terms will be positive. In the range x0,1 < x1,2 < xB the derivative ∂W2∂x1,2 < 0; this
happens once again if the first term dominates the second, i.e. if x1,2 is much larger than x0,1. And
similar results hold for the y-coordinates. Therefore as utility is increasing when both x1,2 < x0,1
and y1,2 < y0,1 and decreasing when both x0,1 < x1,2 < xB and y0,1 < y1,2 < yB individual 2 will
switch his position with individual 1.
In more general terms (considering this problem as a dynamic one which is repeated every two
periods) we could diﬀerentiate with respect to individual i’s location in the following period.
∂Wi
∂x1,i
=
X
i6=j
A
(B + (x0,i − x0,j)2)
Ã
− 2(x1,i − x0,j)
(C + (x1,i − x0,j)2)2
!
−2ax1,i+b = 0 (A.6)
∂Wi
∂y1,i
=
X
i6=j
E
(F + (y0,i − x0,j)2)
Ã
− 2(y1,i − y0,j)
(G+ (y1,i − y0,j)2)2
!
−2ay1,i+b = 0 (A.7)
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For individual i in the range x1,i < x0,j and y1,i < y0,j we will find that ∂Wi∂x1,i ,
∂Wi
∂y1,i
> 0 while
in the range x0,j < x1,i < xB and y0,j < y1,i < yB the derivatives ∂Wi∂x1,i and
∂Wi
∂y1,i
will be negative
if the social distance between individual i in the second period and individual j’s position in the
first period is increasing.
B The Reflection Problem and Endogeneity
In a two level model, we would be interested in taking into account the three social interaction
eﬀects discussed by Manski (1993) using the following type of multilevel regression with random
intercepts
Yij = β0 + β1Y¯j + β2Xij + β3X¯j + eij (B1)
where
β0 = β00 + β01Zj + u0j
The random intercept shows that the heterogeneity across the level two groups is explained by a
set of observable group characteristics, Zj and a random disturbance term, u0j which denotes the
unobserved group eﬀects. Therefore having included all forms of social interactions, we end up with
Yij = β00 + β01Zj + u0j + β1Y¯j + β2Xij + β3X¯j + eij (B2)
and we can interpret the coeﬃcients as follows: β2 and β3 measure the eﬀects of exogenous contex-
tual eﬀect and β1 as measuring the eﬀect of endogenous social interactions. The random intercept
shows that the heterogeneity across the level-two groups is explained by a set of observable group
characteristics, Zj and a random disturbance term, u0j .
One main problem with relationship (B2) is proper identification of the parameters. The main
question is whether the two social eﬀects measured by the parameters β1 and β3 can be distin-
guished from one another and from the non-social eﬀects. This is known as Manski’s reflection
problem and can arise when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in the population
tries to infer whether the average behaviour in a group influences the behaviour of the individuals
that comprise that group. To establish whether we can properly identify the parameters of (B2)
we pursue the following identification strategy.
Taking group means of both sides of (B2) and solving for Y j , we can see that Y¯j is correlated
with the error term since
Y¯j = β0 + β1Y¯j + (β2 + β3) X¯j + υj (B3)
Y¯j =
β0
1− β1
+
(β2 + β3)
1− β1
X¯j +
1
1− β1
υj
Substituting back into the original relationship
32
Yij = β0 + β1
µ
β0
1− β1
+
(β2 + β3)
1− β1
X¯j +
1
1− β1
e¯j
¶
+ β2Xij + β3X¯j + eij (B4)
Yij =
µ
β1β0
1− β1
+ β0
¶
+ β2Xij +
µ
β1 (β2 + β3)
1− β1
+ β3
¶
X¯j +
β1
1− β1
υj + eij
Yij =
β0
1− β1
+ β2Xij +
β1β2 + β3
1− β1
X¯j +
β1
1− β1
υj + eij
Assuming β1 6= 1, this equation shows that we cannot identify and therefore recover all the
coeﬃcients of the original model, except for β2.
As highlighted in Manski (1993) the linear model where β1 6= 1, the composite parameters
β0
1−β1
,β1β2+β3
1−β1
, β1
1−β1
, and β2 are identified if the regressors [1,Xj,Xij, Zj] are linearly independent
in the population. However, we can only recover β2 from the reduced form regression. The reduced
form shows that the eﬀect of the social multiplier β3 and of the peer group eﬀect β1 is to amplify
the natural variations arising from individual and group-level heterogeneity.
Therefore the only way to safely include any form of endogenous social interaction in a multilevel
model, it is necessary to follow the sequence of steps laid out in the main body of the paper, which
implicitly includes Y¯j in the deviation form
Yij = α0 + α1Xij + (β1 − γ1)Xj + e¯j + ij (B5)
where the within-group regression coeﬃcient is still given by α1, but the between-group regression
coeﬃcient is now (β1 − γ1).
C Understanding the Equivalence of Using (Xij − X¯j)
and Xij in a Multilevel Regression
Raudenbush (1989) gave statistical reasons for preferring a centred regression over the uncentred
version, i.e. a preference for
Yij = β˜00 + β˜11
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢
+ β˜12X¯j + u0j + eij (C1)
over
Yij = β0 + β11Xij + β12X¯j + eij (C2)
This was because the model was meant to suﬀer from high collinearity (Aitkin and Longford (1986)).
We can show that the former equation is simply a reparameterisation of the latter.
We start with the latter equation where the constant is in fact a random intercept is defined
as: β0 = β00 + u0j . This becomes
Yij = β00 + β11Xij + β12X¯j + u0j + eij (C3)
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If we look at this relationship within a particular group, j, and rearrange it as follows
Yij =
¡
β00 + β12X¯j + u0j
¢
+ β11Xij + eij (C4)
where
¡
β00 + β12X¯j + u0j
¢
is the random intercept for this group and therefore β11is the within-
group regression coeﬃcient, i.e. the coeﬃcient within this particular group.
If we take averages of (C3) we get the between-group regression (i.e. a regression between the
group means)
Y¯j = β00 + β11X¯j + β12X¯j + υj (C5)
Y¯j = β00 + (β11 + β12) X¯j + υj
where the between-group coeﬃcient is (β11 + β12). A Wald test of the equality of the between-
group and within-group regression coeﬃcients (i.e. a test of the null that β12 > 0) is identical to
the Hausmann specification test for the random intercept model (see Hausman (1978)).
If the within-group and between-group coeﬃcients are diﬀerent we can replace Xij by the
within-group deviation scores :
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢
:
Yij = β˜00 + β˜11
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢
+ β˜12X¯j + u0j + eij (C6)
which is statistically equivalent to (C3) but has a more convenient parameterisation since the sets
of covariates,
¡
Xij − X¯j
¢
and X¯j , are orthogonal and therefore uncorrelated. We get the following
coeﬃcients
Within-Group Coeﬃcients : β˜11 = β11
Between-Group Coeﬃcients : β˜12 = β11 + β12
D Generalising to a Three-Level Model
Looking at the three-level model we wish to end up with a testable relation of the form
Yijk = β0 + β11Xijk + β12X¯jk + β13X¯k + eijk (D1)
Once again within a particular group at level two, we can rearrange to find the within-group
regression coeﬃcient
Yijk =
¡
β0 + β12X¯jk + β13X¯k
¢
+ β11Xijk + eijk (D2)
where
¡
β0 + β2X¯jk + β3X¯k
¢
is the intercept term and β11 is the required coeﬃcient. Taking
means at the second level we can obtain the within-group regression at level two
Y¯jk = β0 + β11X¯jk + β12X¯jk + β13X¯k + υjk (D3)
Y¯jk =
¡
β0 + β13X¯k
¢
+ (β11 + β12) X¯jk + υjk
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the intercept for which is
¡
β0 + β13X¯k
¢
and the within-group regression coeﬃcient at level two is
(β11 + β12). Finally we can also obtain the between-group regression coeﬃcient at level three by
averaging the original relation over the third level groups, denoted by k
Y¯jk = β0 + (β11 + β12 + β13) X¯k + υjk (D4)
which shows that our constant in the original regression, β0, is in fact the constant for the
level three between group regression and that within-group regression coeﬃcient at level three
is (β11 + β12 + β13). Assuming once again that the within-group regression coeﬃcients at each
level are diﬀerent (using the Hausmann specification test) we can replace Xijk and X¯jk by their
within-group deviation scores,
¡
Xijk − X¯jk
¢
and
¡
X¯jk − X¯k
¢
, respectively
Yijk = β0 + β˜11
¡
Xijk − X¯jk
¢
+ β˜12
¡
X¯jk − X¯k
¢
+ β˜13X¯k + eijk (D5)
where now
Within-Group (Level 1) Coeﬃcient: β˜11 = β11
Within-Group (Level 2) Coeﬃcient: β˜12 = (β11 + β12)
Between-Group (Level 3) Coeﬃcient: β˜13 = (β11 + β12 + β13)
With reference to our three-level model, a complete specification including random intercepts
would be as follows
Yijk = β0 + β11Xijk + β12X¯jk + β13X¯k + eijk (D6)
where
β0 = β000 + β010Zjk + e0jk + β001Zk + e00k (D7)
and once again defining Var(eijk) = Σ1, Var(e0jk) = Σ2, and Var(e00k) = Σ3 we assume
eijk | Xijk ∼ N(0,Σ1) Cov(eijk, ei0jk) = 0, ∀i 6= i0
e0jk | Xijk ∼ N(0,Σ2) Cov(e0jk, eijk) = 0
e00k | Xijk ∼ N(0,Σ3) Cov(e00k, uijk) = 0
Cov(e0jk, e00k) = 0
In addition to the random intercepts, we would also be including the intrinsic choice variables as
explanatory factors, Wijk such that the full model becomes
Yijk = β000+β010Zjk+β001Zk+β11Xijk+β12X¯jk+β13X¯k+β2Wijk+e0jk+e00k+eijk (D8)
E Linear Multilevel Modelling Estimation
This Appendix covers linear multilevel modelling estimation. We rewrite (14), as:
Y = β00 + Zβ01 +Xβ1 +Xβ2 +Wβ3 + uθ (E1)
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Y = {Yij} , X = {Xij} ,X =
©
X¯j
ª
, Z = {Zj} and u = {uij}+ {u0j} .
The vectors β00, β01, β1, β2 and β3 denote the fixed coeﬃcients while the vector θ denotes
the random parameters of the model. We first rewrite (E1) in compact form as:
Y = Jλ+ uθ (E2)
The hierarchical two-stage method for estimating the fixed and random parameters (the variance
and covariances of the random coeﬃcients) originally proposed by Goldstein (1986) and imple-
mented in the software MLWiN, is based upon an Iterative Least Squares (IGLS) method that
results in consistent and asymptotically eﬃcient estimates of λ.
First we obtain starting values for λ, λ0, by performing OLS in a standard single level system
assuming the variance at higher level of the model to be zero. Conditioned upon λ0, we form the
vector of residuals which we use to construct an initial estimate, V, the covariance matrix for the
response variable Y. Then we iterate the following procedure first estimating the fixed parameters
in a GLS regression as:
∧
λ = (JTV−1J)−1
¡
JTV−1Y
¢
(E3)
and again calculating residuals bH = Y − J∧λ. We form the matrix product of these residuals and
stack them into a vector, i.e. H∗ = vec(bH bHT ) which is then used in the next level of estimation
to obtain consistent estimates of σ2uij and σ
2
u0j . Hence, we can estimate the random parameters θ
as:
bθ = (u∗TV∗−1u∗)−1 ¡u∗TV∗−1H∗¢ (E4)
where V∗ is the Kronecker product of V, namely V∗ = V⊗V and the covariance matrix is given
by V = E(bH bHT ). The matrix u∗ is the design matrix of the random parameters. The estimates
of σ2uij and σ
2
u0j are used to construct the covariance matrix of the response variable Y at each
iteration using a GLS estimation of the fixed parameters. Once the fixed coeﬃcients are obtained,
updated residuals are formed and the random parameters estimated once again. This procedure is
repeated until some convergence criteria are met.25 As Goldstein (1989) has stressed, the IGLS used
in the context of random multilevel modelling is equivalent to a maximum likelihood method under
multivariate normality which in turn may lead to biased estimates. To produce unbiased estimate we
use a Restricted Iterative Generalized Least Squares (RIGLS) method which, after the convergence
is achieved, turns to be equivalent to a Restricted Maximum Likelihood Estimate (REML). One
advantage of the latter method is that, diﬀerently from IGLS, estimates of the variance components
take into account the loss of the degrees of freedom resulting from the estimation of the regression
parameters. Hence, while the IGLS estimates for the variance components have a downward bias,
the RIGLS estimates don’t.
25Assuming multivariate normality the estimated covariance matrix for the fixed parameter is
cov(
∧
λ) = (JTV−1J)−1and for the random parameters (Goldtsein and Rasbash (1992)) is cov(
∧
θ) =
2(uTV∗−1u)−1.
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Figure 14: National Averages for Exogenous Variables
Table 1: List of Variables.Variables Response Categories Description
L 3 - Cusc

Exogenous Contextual Effects (Zk)Quality of Government Scaled -2.5 to 2.5 Average of: Quality Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality,
Rule of Law, & Control of Corruption.
National GDP Continuous Log of GDP per capita for NUTS0 units.
Exogenous Social Interactions (Xk)
Trust: Country’s Parliament National Average How much do you personally Trust in country’s parliament?
Trust: Police National Average How much you personally trust in the Police?
Trust: People National Average Would you say that most people can be trusted?
Political Interest National Average How interested would you say you are in politics?
Religiosity National Average How religious are you?
Social Engagement National Average How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues?
Social Intimacy National Average Do you have anyone with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters?
Subjective State of Health National Average How is your health in general?
L 2 - R

Exogenous Contextual Effects (Zjk)
Regional GDP Continuous Log of GDP per capita for NUTS1/NUTS2 regional units
Location of Region Unordered 1 - 5 Manual classification according to geographic location:
1=North; 2=Atlantic; 3=Mediterranean; 4=Eastern EU-border; 5=Centre
Settlement Structure Scaled Continuous 0-1 I.1 Agglomerated regions with a centre > 300,000 and a population density > 300 inhabitants/km2,
I.2 Agglomerated regions with a centre > 300,000 or a population density 150,000 - <300/km2
II.2 Urbanised regions with a centre 150,000 - <300,000 and a population density 150 - <300/km2
[or a smaller population density (100 - <150/km2) with a bigger centre (> 300,000)]
II.2 Urbanised regions with a centre 150,000 - <300,000 or a population density 100 - <150/km2
III.1 Rural regions with a population density < 100 inhabitants/km2 and a centre > 125,000
III.2 Rural regions with a population density < 100 inhabitants/km2
or a population density < 100/km2 with a centre < 125,000
Exogenous Social Interactions (Xjk)Trust: Country’s Parliament Regional Average How much do you personally Trust in country’s parliament?
Trust: Police Regional Average How much you personally trust in the Police?
Trust: People Regional Average Would you say that most people can be trusted?
Political Interest Regional Average How interested would you say you are in politics?
Religiosity Regional Average How religious are you?
Social Engagement Regional Average How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues?
Social Intimacy Regional Average Do you have anyone with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters?
Subjective State of Health Regional Average How is your health in general?
1Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003), Governance Indicators.
2Established by Schmidt-Seiwert, Volker (1997): Landkarten zum Vergleich westlicher Regionen. In: Hradil S., Immerfall S. (eds.), Die westeuropäischen Regionen im Vergleich.
Opladen, pp. 603-628. Based on the two criteria population density and size of centres, he distinguishes agglomerations, urbanised areas and rural areas and defines six types of
regions
Table 1: List of Variables (contd.).
Variables Response Categories Description
L 1 - I
usc
Exogenous Social Interactions (Xijk)
Trust: Country’s Parliament Scaled How much do you personally Trust in country’s parliament?
Trust: Police Scaled How much you personally trust in the Police?
Trust: People Scaled Would you say that most people can be trusted?
Social Intimacy Scaled Do you have anyone with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters?
Social Engagement Scaled How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues?
Religiosity Scaled How religious are you?
Political Interest Scaled How interested would you say you are in politics?
1=Very Interested; 2=Quite Interested; 3=Hardly Interested; 4=Not At All Interested.
Subjective State of Health Scaled How is your health in general?
1=Very Good; 2=Good; 3=Fair; 4=Bad; 5=Very Bad.
Intrinsic Socio-demographic Indicators (Wijk)Citizen of Country Binary Are you a citizen of [country]? 1=Yes; 0=No.
Victim of Crime Binary Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?
1=Yes; 0=No
Ethnicity Binary Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]? 1=Yes; 0=No.
Age Binary Dummy variables for ‘Aged less than 25 years’; ‘Aged between 25-34 years’;
‘Aged between 35-44 years’; ‘Aged between 45-54 years’; ‘Aged between 55-64 years’.
Marital Status Binary Dummy variables for ‘Married’; ‘Divorced’; ‘Living with Partner’; ‘Widowed’.
Altruism Continuous How Helpful Are People?
Household Income (Euros per month) Ordinal If you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes your household’s total net income?
J=Less than 150; R=150 to under 300; C=300 to under 500; M=500 to under 1000
F=1000 to under 1500; S=1500 to under 2000; K=2000 to under 2500;
P=2500 to under 3000; D=3000 to under 5000;H=5000 to under 7500;
U=7500 to under 10000; N=10000 or more.
Unemployed Binary 1=Unemployed; 0=Employed
Gender Binary 1=Male; 2=Female
Educational level Binary Dummy variables for ‘High-School’; ‘Post-High’; ‘University’.
Table 2: Pairwise Correlations for the Variables (Dependent and Explanatory) in the Multilevel Model
Y1 Y2 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17
Y1 Happiness 1.0000
Y2 Life Satisfaction 0.7070 1.0000
X1 Trust in People 0.2442 0.2869 1.0000
X2 Altruism 0.2270 0.2546 0.4875 1.0000
X3 Political Interest -0.0992 -0.1216 -0.1692 -0.0998 1.0000
X4 Trust in Parliament 0.2040 0.2623 0.3322 0.2442 -0.2160 1.0000
X5 Trust in Legal System 0.2109 0.2650 0.3354 0.2575 -0.1501 0.5888 1.0000
X6 Trust in Police 0.2413 0.2734 0.2978 0.2562 -0.0942 0.4547 0.6257 1.0000
X7 Trust in Politicians 0.2083 0.2636 0.3374 0.2803 -0.2153 0.7086 0.5449 0.4539 1.0000
X9 Social Engagement 0.1684 0.1406 0.1079 0.0832 -0.0432 0.0311 0.0229 0.0015 0.0186 1.0000
X10 Social Intimacy -0.1751 -0.1382 -0.0667 -0.0643 0.0581 -0.0472 -0.0610 -0.0509 -0.0463 -0.1422 1.0000
X11 Crime Victim 0.0030 0.0135 0.0054 0.0358 0.0339 -0.0055 0.0227 0.0324 0.0160 -0.0599 0.0096 1.0000
X12 Health -0.2941 -0.2905 -0.1436 -0.0858 0.0560 -0.1169 -0.1261 -0.0887 -0.1131 -0.1146 0.1177 0.0095 1.0000
X13 Religious Degree 0.0517 0.0567 0.0051 0.0387 0.0161 0.1027 0.0820 0.1208 0.1115 -0.1042 0.0112 0.0454 0.0314 1.0000
X14 Citizenship -0.0139 -0.0273 -0.0252 -0.0297 0.0429 0.0384 0.0257 -0.0102 0.0401 -0.0128 0.0091 -0.0148 -0.0248 0.0421 1.0000
X15 Unemployed -0.1308 -0.1705 -0.0704 -0.0607 0.0392 -0.0763 -0.0662 -0.0789 -0.0670 0.0140 0.0389 -0.0350 0.0254 -0.0456 0.0237 1.0000
X16 Age -0.0490 -0.0037 -0.0123 0.0603 -0.0844 0.0013 -0.0309 0.0715 0.0260 -0.2257 0.1223 0.1126 0.3258 0.2218 -0.0887 -0.1220 1.0000
X17 Level of Education 0.1154 0.1218 0.1845 0.0816 -0.2775 0.1379 0.1527 0.0587 0.1134 0.0701 -0.1087 -0.0892 -0.2088 -0.1149 -0.0073 -0.0044 -0.2110 1.000
Table 3: The Determinants of Life Satisfaction and Happiness.
Variables Response Categories 2002 2004
Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction
β SD β SD β SD β SD
Level 3 - Country
Exogenous Contextual Eﬀects (Zk)
Quality of Government 0.132 (0.267) 0.153 (0.397) 0.144 (0.163) 0.469 (0.151)∗∗
National GDP 0.049 (0.309) −0.115 (0.402) 0.495 (0.277)∗ −0.284 (0.259)
Exogenous Social Interactions (Xk)
National Average Trust: Country’s Parliament −0.306 (0.444) 0.168 (0.583) −0.599 (0.562) 1.330 (0.523)∗∗
National Average Trust: Police 0.151 (0.191) 0.043 (0.297) 0.437 (0.326) −0.669 (0.302)∗∗
National Average Trust: People 0.625 (0.569) 0.582 (0.764 0.811 (0.333)∗∗ 0.058 (0.312)
National Average Political Interest 0.437 (0.226)∗∗ 0.004 (0.309) 0.189 (0.343) −0.584 (0.320)∗
National Average Religiosity −0.288 (0.195) −0.113 (0.274) −0.418 (0.101)∗∗ −0.371 (0.094)∗∗
National Average Social Engagement 0.198 (0.332) −0.433 (0.477) 0.030 (0.342) −0.903 (0.318)∗∗
National Average Social Intimacy −0.520 (0.906) 1.337 (1.314) 2.043 (1.807)∗∗ 4.731 (1.683)∗∗
National Average State of Health −0.450 (0.302) −0.108 (0.427) −0.460 (0.443) 0.585 (0.410)
National Altruism −0.575 (0.439) −0.100 (0.580) −0.674 (0.437)∗ 0.444 (0.406)
Level 2 - Regions
Exogenous Contextual Eﬀects (Zjk)
Regional GDP 0.142 (0.075)∗∗ 0.076 (0.065) −0.045 (0.051) −0.040 (0.047)
Location of Region
Ref. Category: Atlantic North −0.002 (0.137) 0.056 (0.145) 0.007 (0.069) 0.172 (0.065)∗∗
Mediterranean −0.206 (0.144) −0.087 (0.150) 0.138 (0.080)∗ 0.217 (0.075)∗∗
Eastern EU-border 0.066 (0.141) 0.072 (0.145) −0.092 (0.074) −0.044 (0.070)
Centre −0.073 (0.132) 0.080 (0.134) −0.029 (0.061) 0.061 (0.058)
Exogenous Social Interactions (Xjk −Xk)
Regional Average Trust: Country’s Parliament −0.108 (0.075) −0.121 (0.070)∗∗ −0.067 (0.072) 0.049 (0.068)
Regional Average Trust: Police 0.205 (0.091)∗∗ 0.106 (0.085) 0.130 (0.067)∗ 0.208 (0.063)∗∗
Regional Average Trust: People 0.016 (0.098) 0.062 (0.093) 0.047 (0.072) 0.153 (0.068)∗∗
Regional Average Political Interest 0.719 (0.081)∗∗ 0.436 (0.077)∗∗ −0.061 (0.062) −0.026 (0.058)
Regional Average Religiosity 0.339 (0.074)∗∗ 0.260 (0.069)∗∗ 0.081 (0.059) 0.132 (0.055)∗∗
Regional Average Social Engagement 0.185 (0.076) 0.123 (0.071)∗∗ −0.060 (0.059) −0.095 (0.056)∗
Regional Average Social Intimacy 0.031 (0.163) 0.001 (0.155) −0.243 (0.116)∗∗ −0.262 (0.111)∗∗
Regional Average State of Health 0.131 (0.106) 0.026 (0.098) 0.293 (0.067)∗∗ 0.340 (0.063)∗∗
Regional Average Altruism 0.240 (0.092)∗∗ 0.264 (0.085)∗∗ 0.139 (0.071)∗ 0.072 (0.067)
Table 3: The Determinants of Life Satisfaction and Happiness (contd.).
Variables Response Categories 2002 2004
Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction
β SD β SD β SD β SD
Level 1 - Individuals
Exogenous Social Interactions (Xijk −Xjk)
Trust: Country’s Parliament 0.017 (0.007)∗∗ 0.035 (0.007)∗∗ 0.019 (0.008)∗ 0.046 (0.008)∗∗
Trust: Police 0.089 (0.007)∗∗ 0.089 (0.007)∗∗ 0.119 (0.008)∗∗ 0.107 (0.007)∗∗
Trust: People 0.041 (0.007)∗∗ 0.060 (0.007)∗∗ 0.066 (0.007)∗∗ 0.065 (0.008)∗∗
Religiosity 0.050 (0.007)∗∗ 0.038 (0.007)∗∗ 0.066 (0.007)∗∗ 0.048 (0.007)∗∗
Altruism 0.046 (0.007)∗∗ 0.064 (0.007)∗∗ 0.071 (0.008)∗∗ 0.067 (0.007)∗∗
Social Intimacy 0.275 (0.022)∗∗ 0.160 (0.022)∗∗ 0.263 (0.024)∗∗ 0.171 (0.023)∗∗
Social Engagement
Reference Category: Never Less Than Once A Month 0.020 (0.052) 0.010 (0.051) 0.174 (0.055)∗∗ 0.201 (0.053)∗∗
More Than Once A Month 0.128 (0.051)∗∗ 0.074 (0.050) 0.212 (0.054)∗∗ 0.287 (0.052)∗∗
Several Times A Month 0.171 (0.048)∗∗ 0.119 (0.048)∗∗ 0.324 (0.052)∗∗ 0.376 (0.050)∗∗
Once A Week 0.221 (0.048)∗∗ 0.146 (0.048)∗∗ 0.334 (0.052)∗∗ 0.388 (0.050)∗∗
Several Times A Week 0.261 (0.048)∗∗ 0.182 (0.047)∗∗ 0.423 (0.051)∗∗ 0.463 (0.050)∗∗
Every Day 0.382 (0.049)∗∗ 0.268 (0.049)∗∗ 0.569 (0.053)∗∗ 0.540 (0.051)∗∗
Political Interest
Ref. Category: Very Interested Quite Interested −0.024 (0.025) −0.014 (0.024) 0.044 (0.026)∗∗ 0.026 (0.025)
Hardly Interested −0.067 (0.020)∗∗ -0.035 (0.019)∗∗ −0.060 (0.020)∗∗ −0.059 (0.020)∗∗
Not At All Interested −0.083 (0.019)∗∗ −0.037 (0.019)∗∗ −0.040 (0.020)∗∗ −0.038 (0.019)∗
State of Health
Ref. Category: Very Good Good 0.928 (0.059)∗∗ 1.040 (0.059)∗∗ 0.995 (0.067)∗∗ 0.981 (0.065)∗∗
Fair 0.678 (0.058)∗∗ 0.801 (0.058)∗∗ 0.713 (0.066)∗∗ 0.734 (0.064)∗∗
Bad 0.449 (0.059)∗∗ 0.572 (0.058)∗∗ 0.520 (0.066)∗∗ 0.532 (0.064)∗∗
Very Bad 0.205 (0.063)∗∗ 0.322 (0.062)∗∗ 0.191 (0.070)∗∗ 0.135 (0.068)∗
Intrinsic Socio-demographic Indicators (Wijk)
Citizen of Country 0.112 (0.034)∗∗ 0.104 (0.034)∗∗ 0.041 (0.035) 0.115 (0.034)∗∗
Victim of Crime −0.046 (0.015)∗∗ −0.049 (0.014)∗∗ −0.019 (0.015) −0.024 (0.015)∗
Ethnicity −0.082 (0.035)∗∗ −0.063 (0.035)∗ −0.133 (0.038)∗∗ −0.163 (0.037)∗∗
Age
Ref. Category: Aged less than 25 Aged between 25-34 years −0.095 (0.025)∗∗ −0.076 (0.025)∗∗ −0.096 (0.026)∗∗ −0.115 (0.026)∗∗
Aged between 35-44 years −0.186 (0.026)∗∗ −0.153 (0.025)∗∗ −0.216 (0.027)∗∗ −0.203 (0.026)∗∗
Aged between 45-54 years −0.185 (0.027)∗∗ −0.154 (0.027)∗∗ −0.238 (0.028)∗∗ −0.203 (0.028)∗∗
Aged between 55-64 years −0.064 (0.029)∗∗ −0.006 (0.028) −0.146 (0.030)∗∗ −0.048 (0.029)∗
Aged Over 65 years 0.068 (0.030)∗∗ 0.156 (0.030)∗∗ 0.019 (0.031) 0.133 (0.030)∗∗
Marital Status
Married 0.334 (0.018)∗∗ 0.210 (0.017)∗∗ 0.345 (0.019)∗∗ 0.237 (0.019)∗∗
Divorced −0.008 (0.027) −0.026 (0.027) 0.083 (0.028)∗∗ 0.067 (0.027)∗∗
Living with Partner 0.223 (0.020)∗∗ 0.138 (0.020)∗∗ 0.264 (0.023)∗∗ 0.166 (0.022)∗∗
Widowed −0.006 (0.029) 0.053 (0.029) −0.026 (0.031) 0.069 (0.030)∗
Educational level
High-School −0.035 (0.016)∗∗ −0.008 (0.016) −0.040 (0.017)∗∗ −0.011 (0.016)
Post-High −0.050 (0.024)∗∗ −0.007 (0.024) −0.010 (0.030) 0.009 (0.029)
University −0.061 (0.018)∗∗ −0.025 (0.018)∗∗ −0.070 (0.019)∗∗ −0.046 (0.018)∗∗
Table 3: The Determinants of Life Satisfaction and Happiness (contd.).
Variables Response Categories 2002 2004
Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction
β SD β SD β SD β SD
Level 1 - Individuals
Intrinsic Socio-demographic Indicators (Wijk)
Female 0.064 (0.012)∗∗ 0.078 (0.012)∗∗ 0.055 (0.013)∗∗ 0.036 (0.012)∗∗
Unemployed −0.289 (0.027)∗∗ −0.332 (0.027)∗∗ −0.231 (0.027)∗∗ −0.312 (0.026)∗∗
Household Income (Euros per month)
Ref. Category: Less than 150 150 to under 300 −0.101 (0.071) 0.007 (0.070) 0.074 (0.083) −0.072 (0.080)
300 to under 500 −0.040 (0.067) 0.051 (0.067) −0.005 (0.076) −0.168 (0.074)∗∗
500 to under 1000 0.068 (0.065) 0.174 (0.064)∗∗ −0.003 (0.072) −0.125 (0.070)∗
1000 to under 1500 0.108 (0.065)∗ 0.209 (0.064)∗∗ 0.051 (0.072) −0.062 (0.070)
1500 to under 2000 0.125 (0.065)∗ 0.236 (0.065)∗∗ 0.111 (0.072) −0.004 (0.070)
2000 to under 2500 0.153 (0.066)∗ 0.310 (0.065)∗∗ 0.132 (0.073)∗ 0.035 (0.071)
2500 to under 3000 0.171 (0.066)∗∗ 0.306 (0.066)∗∗ 0.221 (0.073)∗∗ 0.117 (0.071)∗
3000 to under 5000 0.158 (0.066)∗∗ 0.342 (0.066)∗∗ 0.197 (0.073)∗∗ 0.133 (0.070)∗
5000 to under 7500 0.197 (0.069)∗∗ 0.388 (0.069)∗∗ 0.262 (0.075)∗∗ 0.160 (0.073)∗
7500 to under 10000 0.192 (0.082)∗∗ 0.413 (0.081)∗∗ 0.026 (0.084) 0.128 (0.082)
10000 or more 0.196 (0.093)∗∗ 0.453 (0.093)∗∗ 0.293 (0.089)∗∗ 0.212 (0.086)∗∗
Variance Components
Σ3 0.006 (0.004)
∗∗ 0.021 (0.009)∗∗ 0.006 (0.003)∗ 0.005 (0.002)∗∗
Σ2 0.026 (0.004)
∗∗
0.018 (0.003)∗∗ 0.003 (0.001)∗∗ 0.002 (0.001)∗∗
Σ1 0.679 (0.007)
∗∗
0.669 (0.007)∗∗ 0.665 (0.007)∗∗ 0.629 (0.007)∗∗
Intraclass Correlation
Σ1
Σ1+Σ2+Σ3
0.954 0.944 0.986 0.988
Σ2
Σ2+Σ3
0.619 0.461 0.330 0.280
Excess Variance
Σ3/Σ2 0.23 1.166 2.000 2.500
Σ2/Σ1 0.038 0.026 0.005 0.003
Test Variance
χ2(1 df) H0 : Σ3 = Σ2 0.109 2.084 0.658 1.668
H0 : Σ2 = Σ1 1645.791∗∗ 838.41∗∗ 1444.008∗∗ 1578.139∗∗
H0 : Σ3 = Σ1 1271.293∗∗ 1594.11∗∗ 760.578∗∗ 840.901∗∗
Number of Observations 19875 19875 17932 17932
The comparison group is male, aged less than 25, employed in labour force, whose educational level and household income is in the lowest category.
∗: Significance level at 0.05 level, ∗∗Significance at 0.01 level.
